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Abstract  
The Malawi kwacha was floated in February 1994. Since then, the Reserve Bank of Malawi 
(RBM) has periodically intervened in the foreign exchange market. This report analyses the 
effectiveness of foreign exchange market interventions by RBM. We used a generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic (GARCH; 1, 1) model to simultaneously estimate the 
effect of intervention on the mean and volatility of the kwacha. We also ran an equilibrium 
exchange rate model and use the equilibrium exchange rate criterion to compare results with 
those from the GARCH model. 
Using monthly exchange rates and official intervention data from January 1995 to June 2008, 
results from the GARCH model indicated that net sales of United States dollars by RBM 
depreciate, rather than appreciate, the kwacha. Empirically, this implies the RBM “leans against 
the wind”, i.e., the RBM intervenes to reduce, but not reverse, around-trend exchange rate 
depreciation. However, results from the GARCH model for the post-2003 period indicated that 
RBM intervention in the market stabilizes the kwacha. In general, results from both the GARCH 
model and the real equilibrium exchange rate criterion for the entire study period showed that 
RBM interventions have been associated with increased exchange rate volatility, except during 
the post-2003 period. The implication of this finding is that intervention can only have a 
temporary influence on the exchange rate, as it is difficult to find empirical evidence showing that 
intervention has a long-lasting, quantitatively significant effect.  
JEL:E5 E52 E58 
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     1.0    Introduction 
Most central banks, especially in developing countries, use foreign exchange market 
intervention1 as a policy tool for macroeconomic stabilization. In Malawi, the exchange rate 
was floated in February 1994. Since then, the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) has 
periodically intervened in the foreign exchange market. In line with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions under the structural adjustment package, the RBM has also 
intervened to buy foreign exchange in order to build up reserves for the government and to 
moderate exchange rate fluctuations.  
There has been much debate in the literature on the question of whether these interventions 
affect the value of the kwacha. Friedman (1953) provides the classic argument against central 
bank intervention in foreign exchange markets. Later, the introduction of models that allowed 
for imperfect information (Brainard, 1967; Poole, 1970) led to the conclusion that exchange 
rate policies could be used for stabilization purposes. Work on optimal foreign exchange 
market intervention by Boyer (1978) helped achieve an uneasy consensus in the theoretical 
literature. It was shown that optimal exchange rate policies lie between the theoretical 
extremes of complete exchange rate fixity and flexibility. Optimal policy responses were 
shown to be a function of the nature of the shocks to the economy and to be dependent on the 
degree of capital mobility in the economy (Doroodian and Caporale, 2001). 
In contrast, empirical work on the actual impact of foreign exchange intervention has not 
yielded a consensus. Studies that regressed exchange rate on intervention variable have often 
found coefficients with ambiguous signs (Doroodian and Caporale, 2001). For example, one 
might interpret a negative coefficient  as evidence that official sales of foreign exchange 
depreciate the local currency (a perverse response) or that officials prevented a steeper 
depreciation from occurring, a “leaning against the wind response” (Humpage, 1988 ; 
Dominguez and Frankel, 1993). Friedman (1953) suggests that a simple way to determine the 
desirability of intervention is to test if it is profitable. Taylor (1982) finds that official 
intervention is almost always unprofitable. These initial findings led to numerous studies on 
                                                
1
 Intervention refers to official sales or purchases of foreign exchange to influence exchange rate. In this report, we have used net 
sales of foreign exchange as our intervention variable. 
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this topic, some of which find strong evidence of profitable intervention. Most recently, 
Leahy (1995) finds that official intervention by the Federal Reserve has consistently 
generated profits. However, using generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic 
(GARCH) methodology, Doroodian and Caporale (2001) find a statistically significant 
impact of intervention on spot rates for the United States of America.  
These conflicting results have led many researchers to adopt different empirical 
methodologies to study the impact of intervention. However, these studies have done little to 
narrow the gap in opinion concerning intervention (Doroodian and Caporale, 2001). Recent 
academic work concerning the appropriateness and effectiveness of official intervention 
range from the generally favourable view of Dominguez and Frankel (1993) to the contention 
that intervention is an “exercise in futility” that at best can have only a very short-run effect 
on exchange values and at worst serve to introduce harmful amounts of uncertainty and 
volatility in foreign exchange markets (Schwartz, 1996).  
1.1  Objective of the study 
The main objective of the study is to examine the efficacy of the official intervention in 
foreign exchange markets. Specifically, the report tries to answer the following questions:  
• Floatation of the kwacha was intended to be market determined, but has it really been 
market determined?  
• Has intervention influenced movements of the kwacha?  
• Has intervention dampened and smoothened the volatility of the Malawi kwacha?  
• What is the role of the balance of payments pressures on the direction and volatility 
of the Malawi kwacha?  
In view of the conflicting results from empirical literature, there has been a rising need for 
researchers to adopt different methodologies to resolve conflicting findings. In this study, we 
used two methodologies to evaluate the impact of Reserve Bank of Malawi intervention in 
the foreign exchange market. The first was a GARCH approach, a recent development in 
econometric methodology for assessing the degree of volatility. Results from the GARCH 
methodology were compared with results from another approach, the equilibrium exchange 
rate criterion.  
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The issue of the effect of intervention on the exchange market in Malawi is significant on 
both research and policy fronts. On the research front, very few such papers have been done 
on Africa and only one is known to the authors. It is of policy interest because, if intervention 
has an effect on the kwacha, this offers the monetary authorities an additional policy tool 
independent from general monetary policy. 
In the next section, we discuss exchange rate management in Malawi. This is followed by the 
theoretical underpinnings for the study and a review of results in recent contributions to 
empirical literature on effectiveness of central bank interventions. The next section outlines 
the methodology used in the study. This is followed by a summary of the main findings of 
our empirical research. The final section concludes the report and offers some policy 
recommendations. 
2.0 Monetary policy and exchange rate management in Malawi 
2.1    Monetary policy 
The objective of monetary policy continues to be price stability. To achieve this, reserve 
money remains the anchor of monetary policy. RBM uses a combination of instruments to 
achieve its objective on monetary policy. These include the bank rate, liquidity reserve 
requirements, open market operations, and sales and purchases of foreign exchange. This 
framework, however, requires flexibility of interest and foreign exchange rates.  
The Central Bank closely watches all indicators that would entail price developments 
including consumer price index (CPI) inflation, growth in gross domestic product (GDP), 
monetary growth and expansion of credit (see Table 1). 
Table 1: Selected macroeconomic indicators 
      2000            2001   2002     2003       2004  2005 
Real GDP 1      0.2             -4.1    1.8       3.9          5.1  1.9 
CPI inflation2       29.3 27.5  14.8       9.6          11.5            16.5 
M2 (money supply)3      47.1   22.1  25.2      29.3         29.8            14.3 
MK/US$ rate3        80.09          72.15    76.69       108.57     108.94        123.63 
1. Annual percentage change.    
2. Year-on-year of inflation.  
3. Period average. 
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi Monthly Economic Reviews (December 2003 and December 2009).  Deleted:  
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In trying to attain its goal of price stability, RBM establishes an annual inflation rate target, 
announced by the Minister of Finance in the Budget Statement to Parliament, and monetary 
aggregates as intermediate targets. 
2.2 Exchange management in Malawi 
The management of the exchange rate in Malawi has been pursued with three major policy 
objectives in mind:  
i. Maintenance of a sustainable balance of payments position.  
ii. Attainment of stable domestic prices.  
iii. Attainment of growth in real income.  
These objectives were attained to some extent in the 1970s. However, owing to both external 
and internal factors, they were difficult to achieve in the 1980s. The late 1990s and early 
2000s brought unique challenges emanating from the opening up of the economy and from 
globalization. A common feature of developing countries like Malawi is that their 
international trade is in terms of major world currencies rather than their own. Thus the 
operation of the global financial system is of paramount importance to such economies. 
These countries therefore have to consider the fluctuations of the major world currencies 
when deciding on exchange arrangements.  
In most cases, large exchange rate fluctuations do not reflect economic fundamentals, while 
in some cases they may only be equilibrating or reflecting diverging cyclical positions or 
monetary policies. Consequently, the issue becomes whether a policy initiative aimed at 
stabilizing the exchange rate is necessary. In other words, to what extent do the medium term 
exchange rate fluctuations represent misalignments that have detrimental implications on the 
allocation of resources and for macroeconomic stability?  This question will have to be 
answered honestly, but we first give the background to the current situation.  
2.2.1   The floatation of the kwacha 
In February 1994 Malawi adopted a managed float exchange rate regime. This was aimed at 
resolving the foreign exchange crisis that had hit the country due to suspension of balance of 
payments support from donors, and the lagged effects of the 1992–1993 drought. The switch 
from the fixed regime to the floating one was meant to achieve certain objectives which can 
be summed up as: 
i. Improvement of the country’s export competitiveness. 
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ii. Provision of an efficient foreign exchange allocation mechanism. 
iii. Dampening speculative attacks on the kwacha. Before the floatation, 
devaluations had become more frequent and very predictable thereby making 
the whole system unstable. 
iv. Restoration of investor and donor confidence. The country’s foreign reserves 
had dwindled to such low levels that it was difficult to do business with the 
rest of the world. 
After the floatation, the Malawi kwacha/US dollar exchange rate depreciated from around 
K4.5 in February to over K17 in September 1994. The pass-through effect from exchange 
rate fluctuations to inflation is very high in Malawi due to the high import content in the CPI. 
Consequently, the rise in the inflation rate undermined inter alia monetary aggregates, which 
were deemed unsustainable by the monetary authorities. It therefore became necessary to 
adopt the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for inflation and for macroeconomic 
convergence. 
Figure 1:  Evolution of nominal exchange rate and official foreign reserves  
nominal exchange rate and official reserves
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Note: ex stands for exchange rate; offr stands for official reserves import cover. 
Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Monthly Economic Reviews (December, 2009; December, 2003, and December, 2000).  
The nominal exchange rate has maintained a steady but depreciating long-run trend, while foreign 
reserves which were on the rise in the 1990s, have since dropped and have remained on the lower 
side (Figure 1). This is similar to the trends in gross foreign reserves (see Appendix 2). In the 
short- run, the kwacha appears to have some level of stability.  
2.2.2 RBM intervention in the foreign exchange market  
 9 
The RBM intervenes in the foreign exchange market primarily to smooth seasonal fluctuations 
related to the agricultural cycle and the build foreign exchange reserves.  
The major players in the foreign exchange market in Malawi are the two major commercial banks 
(authorized dealer banks), the tobacco companies (Limbe Leaf and STANCOM), the sugar 
company (ILLOVO), and the foreign exchange bureaus. The foreign exchange bureaus were 
granted permission to operate from the mid 1990s to incorporate a parallel market into the legal 
foreign exchange system in Malawi. Operators in the bureaux de change are private entrepreneurs 
who have been formally recognized by government to deal in foreign exchange and provide 
access to foreign exchange in a convenient and informal manner.  
Due to the seasonal nature of the foreign exchange earnings related to agricultural activities 
coupled with the fact that tobacco exports account for about 60% of the foreign exchange 
earnings, the Malawi kwacha is normally expected to appreciate during the tobacco marketing 
season (April to August), reflecting increased supply of foreign exchange on the market, and to 
depreciate during the off-season reflecting increased demand for foreign exchange, as the 
economy imports farm inputs such as fertilizer. This seasonal pattern may vary if, during that 
time of the year, the country has received substantial donor inflows.  
A liberalized foreign exchange market environment implies that the Reserve Bank cannot dictate 
the value of the Malawi Kwacha. However, it is possible for the RBM to influence the value of 
the Kwacha by buying foreign exchange when there is an excess in the market and selling when 
there is a shortage (see Table 2 for basic statistics on RBM intervention).  
Table 2: RBM intervention: Basic statistics  
Malawi kwacha/US dollar 
                                                             Purchases                      Sales 
Mean 
Median 
Standard deviation 
Maximum 
Minimum 
No. of observations 
 
-6.144813 
-1.900000 
-9.927213 
-84.690000 
0.00000 
160 
12.25119 
9.35000 
12.21028 
57.70000 
 0.00000 
160 
The figures are in million Malawi kwacha. 
Source: author’s calculation using RBM data.  
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This means therefore that in theory RBM can maintain a stable exchange rate by intervening in 
the foreign exchange market. In practice, however, RBM has to consider the monetary 
implications and the implications of such interventions on the position of official foreign reserves. 
As the Reserve Bank buys foreign exchange from the market, the supply of Malawi kwacha in the 
economy increases and this has potential to cause inflationary pressures. For the Reserve Bank to 
sell foreign exchange to the market, it must first have adequate foreign exchange reserves. And, 
as a source of its own foreign exchange reserves, RBM also relies on whatever it is able to buy 
from the market, and on if there were any inflows of donor funds. Any constraints on these two 
sources means RBM will have inadequate capacity to support the market effectively, thereby 
affecting the surplus/demand balance in the market. Overall, RBM has to do a lot of balancing in 
managing the exchange rate to ensure that the achievement of a stable exchange rate, which is 
good for the farmer, does not come at the expense of inflation and the depletion of foreign 
exchange reserves. 
During the period 1995–1997, the exchange rate fluctuated within a very narrow fixed band and 
accordingly, foreign reserves were used to support the exchange rate (see Figure 2). The main 
objective of attaining low inflation rates was achieved towards the end of 1997 but at the expense 
of huge foreign exchange reserves and high interest rates, which were used to support the 
exchange rate. Consequently, the real exchange rate appreciated and had a negative impact on the 
current account balance. In other words, the current account imbalance that emerged during the 
period of fixed exchange rates was being covered by a run down of reserves. 
Figure 2: RBM intervention and nominal exchange rates (1995–1997) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               Data source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Monthly Economic Review (December, 2000) 
 
net sales and nominal exchange rate
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
Ma
r-9
5
Ju
n-
95
Se
p-9
5
De
c-
95
Ma
r-9
6
Ju
n-
96
Se
p-9
6
De
c-
96
Ma
r-9
7
Ju
n-
97
Se
p-9
7
De
c-
97
months/years
ex
ch
an
ge
 
ra
te
s
-40.0
-30.0
-20.0
-10.0
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
n
et
 
sa
le
s 
(m
k 
m
n
)
ex
net sales
 11 
After achieving the inflation objective during 1997, the target of the monetary authorities was 
then to revive the lost competitiveness within a reasonable period of time. It soon became clear 
that the narrow band had to be abandoned in favour of an unannounced crawling peg. During this 
period the authorities were not committed to defend the currency thus the central parity rate was 
adjusted every time the maximum level (i.e. the upper limit of the band) was reached. Thus 
between 1997 and 1998 the exchange rate moved from around K15 to K38 to the US dollar 
(Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3:   RBM intervention and nominal exchange rate (1997–1998) 
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  Data source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Monthly Economic Review (December, 2000)  
This adjustment in the exchange rate brought back some competitiveness in the country’s foreign 
trade. Consequently, the system was abandoned towards the end of 1998 and the exchange rate 
started operating in a more market fashion, i.e. the free-floating system. This system saw 
authorized dealer banks taking a more active role in determining the path for the Kwacha. 
Unfortunately, during this period (1998–2002), the exchange rate was very unstable and, not 
surprisingly, there was public outcry. 
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Figure 4:  RBM intervention and nominal exchange rate (1998–2002)  
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Data source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Monthly Economic Reviews, (December, 2003, and December2000).  
The free-float system, is perhaps remembered by the first ever appreciation of the Kwacha in 
2001 (see figure 4). This appreciation came on the back of huge foreign reserves. (A short period 
of exchange rate instability followed until a policy decision was taken in August 2003 to stabilize 
the Kwacha at a rate of K108 against the US dollar. The decision was in response to serious 
economic disequilibrium or instability following the suspension of the first IMF Poverty 
Reduction Growth Facility (PRGF) and the droughts in the early 2000s. The kwacha–US dollar 
exchange rate remained largely unchanged from August 2003 until mid-March 2005 when a 
series of adjustments saw the Kwacha resting at K123 against the US dollar. The Kwacha then 
stabilized at those levels until early 2006, when economic conditions necessitated a further review 
(see figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: RBM intervention and nominal exchange rate (2003–2008)  
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 Data source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Monthly Economic Reviews (December, 2009, and December, 2006).  
2.2.3 Nominal and real exchange rate, and foreign reserves 
Regarding the behaviour of the kwacha in real terms, the real exchange rate (RER), which had 
been appreciating since 2000,2 with a rapid rise in official reserves, started depreciating in late 
2001 as official reserves started declining. Since 2004, the real exchange rate has stabilized 
except for a few short-run fluctuations related to the seasonal cycle of agricultural activities 
(Figure 6). During this period, rising aid and productivity have supported the real exchange rate, 
but declining terms of trade (TOT) have outweighed these factors, as indicated by slow reserve 
accumulation.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6:   Nominal and real exchange rate, and foreign reserves (2000–2008) 
                                                
2
 The huge reserves in 2001also supported the first ever appreciation of the kwacha. 
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0.000
20.000
40.000
60.000
80.000
100.000
120.000
140.000
160.000
Ju
n-
00
Ju
n-
01
Ju
n-
02
Ju
n-
03
Ju
n-
04
Ju
n-
05
Ju
n-
06
Ju
n-
07
Ju
n-
08
month/year
ex
ch
an
ge
 
ra
te
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
im
po
rt
 
co
ve
r
rer
ex
forex
 
 Data source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Monthly Economic Reviews (December, 2009, and December, 2006)  
International reserves have been declining since late 2001 (see Figure 6). But it is clear that from 
2004, the kwacha has been largely stable and yet the levels of reserves have been too low and 
fluctuating. Even gross official reserves have been on the lower side (Figure 1b in the appendix). 
So what explains the stability of the kwacha in the face of low international reserves? One could 
argue that the explanation could be found in the proportion of official reserves (RBM) and 
commercial bank reserves respectively to gross reserves (Appendix 2). The Reserve Bank is a 
dormant player in Malawi’s foreign exchange market (as evidenced by the wide gap between 
official reserves and commercial bank reserves). Using its market power coupled with moral 
suasion, it is possible for RBM to conduct its transactions with commercial banks at 
administrative exchange rates and consequently influence the commercial banks to maintain their 
rates at low levels.  
The limited supply of foreign exchange on the market has resulted in the widening spreads, i.e. 
the difference between rates offered by commercial banks and foreign exchange bureaus.3 These 
spreads, also known as exchange rate premium, rose substantially in June 2007 and have 
remained wide (Figure 7).  
 
 
 
 
                                                
3
 The foreign exchange bureaus were  established to incorporate and absorb the parallel market into the legal foreign 
exchange market. 
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Figure 7: Official and parallel exchange rate trends 
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Data source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Monthly Economic Review (December, 2009, December 2003)  
3.0    Literature review  
3.1 Theory of intervention4 
Most studies in literature on the impact of intervention consider sterilized intervention. The 
papers do not focus on unsterilized intervention which, because it affects the monetary base, is 
generally assumed to have a significant influence on the exchange rate. There is general 
agreement in literature that unsterilized sale of foreign exchange would be expected, other things 
being equal, to appreciate the exchange rate through contraction of money supply and therefore 
interest rates. Sterilized intervention is where the authorities take deliberate action to offset 
intervention in the foreign exchange market with an equal change in the net domestic credit; this 
happens either simultaneously or with some short lag, while leaving interest rates unchanged. 
Conversely, intervention is non-sterilized when it is conducted without any action taken to offset 
the impact of intervention. 
 The relationship between exchange rates and monetary control largely comes from the balance 
sheets of central banks. On the liabilities side, there is the base money (BM) which comprises 
reserves, currency and the central bank’s net worth. On the assets side, there is net foreign assets 
(NFA) and net domestic assets (NDA). Any intervention in the foreign exchange market will 
change NFA (Simatele, 2004). Assuming that net worth is insignificant, a summary of the balance 
sheet can be presented as:  
                            BM = NFA + NDA 
                                                
4
 This section relies heavily on the work of Simatele (2004). 
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Sterilization needs the central bank to take deliberate action such as open market operation sales 
or purchases of securities. Once this is done, the result will be an equal change in domestic assets. 
Without sterilization, the monetary base also changes, i.e.  
                                  ∆BM = ∆NFA  
The size of sterilization largely depends on the extent to which simultaneous changes take place 
in NDA as NFA changes (Simatele, 2004). Full sterilization happens when changes in NFA are 
totally offset by changes in NDA, thus the expressions: 
                                - ∆NFA = ∆NDA        
and  
                                    ∆BM = 0 
In this case there would be no impact on the monetary base. The changes will eventually result in 
changes in broader money aggregates and interest rates. Consequently, this will affect 
expectations, capital inflows and eventually the exchange rate.  
Sterilized intervention5 can affect exchange rate through two channels: the portfolio balance and 
the signalling channels. The literature on effectiveness of intervention adopts the general view 
that exchange rates are determined in asset markets and they adjust to equilibrate global demands 
for stocks of national assets rather than demand for flows of national goods. In the class asset 
market models using the portfolio balance approach, domestic and foreign markets are deemed to 
be imperfect substitutes. In these models, asset holders allocate their portfolios to balance 
exchange rate risk against expected rates of return which are affected by relative supplies of 
assets. In the class of asset market models using the monetary approach, domestic and foreign 
assets are deemed to be perfect substitutes. This approach makes portfolio shares infinitely 
sensitive to changes in expected rates of return. In contrast to portfolio balance models, monetary 
models typically focus on demand for and supply of money, bond supplies being irrelevant when 
all bonds are perfect substitutes. 
 
 
                                                
5
 RBM sterilizes its foreign exchange market intervention whenever it is perceived that intervention in the foreign exchange market 
will affect reserve money targets to the extent that the targets will be missed. Since money targets are usually tight, the Bank therefore 
often sterilizes its foreign exchange market intervention. 
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3.1.1   The portfolio balance channel 
The portfolio approach is commonly used to assess the effectiveness of intervention because it 
identifies a direct channel through which intervention can influence exchange rate. This one states 
that sterilizing intervention through typical open market operations will change the currency 
composition of government securities held by the public (Humpage, 2003). A sterilized purchase 
of foreign exchange, for example, increases the amount of domestic bonds held by the public 
relative to foreign bonds, resulting in a depreciation of the local currency. Unfortunately, most 
empirical studies find the relationship to be statistically insignificant. The reason offered for the 
lack of a portfolio effect is that the typical intervention transaction is minor relative to the stock 
of outstanding assets. Dominguez (1998) is a notable exception to this conclusion.  
3.1.2   Signalling channel 
The second channel is the signalling or expectations channel. Mussa (1981) suggests that central 
banks might give indications regarding future, unanticipated changes in monetary policy through 
their sterilized interventions, with sales or purchases of foreign exchange implying monetary 
tightening or easing respectively. This would have direct implications for future fundamentals 
and traders would immediately adjust spot exchange rate quotations. Mussa suggests that such 
signals could be particularly strong—more so than a mere announcement of monetary policy 
intentions—because interventions give monetary authorities open positions in foreign currencies 
that would result in losses if they failed to confirm their signal. Reeves (1997) has formalized 
Mussa’s approach and demonstrates that if the signal is not fully realistic or if the market does not 
use all available information, then the response of the exchange rate intervention will be low. 
However, Edison (1993) argues that intervention is effective and occurs through both the 
portfolio balance and signalling channels.  
3.2     Empirical findings 
Studies in empirical literature use various approaches to evaluate the impact of central bank 
intervention. Problems arise in surveying studies of intervention. One of them is that literature is 
somewhat fragmented. Although there are often several articles on a particular topic, they tend 
not to build on one another or to broaden previous research. This self-imposed isolation makes it 
difficult to explain why results differ from study to study, a problem that is particularly acute in 
the recent literature on the signalling and portfolio balance channels (Edison, 1993). 
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Danker et al. (1987) estimate portfolio balance models and evaluate separate balance of separate 
bilateral equations for US dollar exchange rates with the Deutsche mark, the yen, and the 
Canadian dollar. Their findings provide little evidence to support the portfolio balance model. 
Loopesko (1984) analyses the impact of sterilized intervention using data on US exchange rate 
vis-à-vis the currencies of other G-7 countries. She finds that in about half the cases, cumulated 
intervention is significant, which leads her to conclude that sterilized intervention may have an 
impact on the exchange rate through a portfolio balance channel. However, Dominguez and 
Frankel (1992) investigate both the signalling and portfolio balance channels. They use mean 
variance optimization restrictions employed by many other portfolio balance studies, but differs 
from previous studies in finding that intervention works through both channels. They, however, 
fail to explain precisely how their findings contradict other research on the same subject.  
Leayah (1989) uses daily data to examine the profitability of US intervention. In general, his 
results show that the calculations are sensitive to changes in sample periods. Murray et al. (1990) 
give empirical evidence of the profitability of Canadian intervention from 1975 to 1988. Their 
results suggest that Canadian intervention has been very profitable over the post-Bretton Woods 
period as a whole, although substantial trading losses were realized through most of the 1980s. 
Mayer and Taguchi (1983) attempt to circumvent some of the problems inherent in the profit 
criterion by proposing a number of criteria to evaluate intervention. All of the alternatives involve 
the calculation of the equilibrium exchange rate for use as the reference rate. Using monthly data 
they find that German, Japanese and British intervention was primarily stabilizing from January 
1994 to June 1982.  
Doroodian and Caporale (2001) provide additional empirical evidence on the topic of the 
effectiveness of Federal Reserve intervention on the US exchange rate. Using a daily measure of 
exchange rate intervention in the yen/dollar and mark/dollar exchange rate market for the period 
1985–1997, they find a statistically significant effect of intervention on spot rates. A generalized 
autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity exchange rate equation is used to measure the 
impact of intervention on exchange rate uncertainty. The study finds that intervention is 
associated with a significant increase in the inter-day conditional variance (uncertainty) of both 
bilateral spot exchange rates. This supports the view of Friedman and Schwartz (1953) that 
exchange rate intervention serves to destabilize the foreign exchange market by introducing 
additional levels of exchange rate uncertainty. Simatele (2004) investigates the effect of central 
bank intervention on the Zambian kwacha. She uses a GARCH (1,1) model simultaneously 
estimating the effect of intervention on the mean and variance. She finds that central bank 
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intervention in the foreign exchange market increases the mean but reduces the volatility of the 
Zambian kwacha. The explanation supports the “speculative bandwagon” and a “leaning against 
the wind” strategy. Although there is no attempt to distinguish the channel through which 
intervention works, Simatele (2004) argues that this is more likely to be a signalling affect rather 
than a portfolio balance. Dominguez (1992) uses GARCH models to investigate whether 
intervention by US and German authorities has influenced the variance of the exchange rate. She 
finds that intervention has tended to decrease exchange rate volatility, the exception being US 
intervention from 1985 to 1987, which increased volatility. 
Lewis (1991) develops and implements a target-zone model in which intervention is used to keep 
exchange rates near their target levels. She employs a multi-nominal model to estimate the 
probability of intervention by the G-3 central banks. She finds that intervention increases the 
exchange rates, as they deviate from their targets.  
Simatele et al. 920090 investigates Bank of Zambia intervention. Results indicate that Bank of 
Zambia leans against the wind: it intervenes to reduce but not reverse around-trend exchange-rate 
depreciation, giving positive correlation of intervention with depreciation. The study also states 
that these shorter-term, transitory effects arise through the leaning against the wind channel, not 
through the signalling or portfolio balance channels. Bank of Zambia intervention affects 
deviations around trend; trend depreciation appears to depend on trend monetary growth. Rogers 
and Siklos (2003) find leaning against the wind behaviour for Canada and Australia; they 
comment: “Most studies find evidence that central banks intervene mainly to smooth exchange 
rate fluctuations and not their levels.” Herrera and Özbay (2005) argue that in the Central Bank of 
Turkey’s intervention function, the asymmetric effects they find for positive and negative 
deviations from trend signifies leaning against the wind. 
In general, literature finds no significant impact of intervention through the portfolio balance 
channel. In contrast, most of the empirical evidence suggests that intervention can affect the 
exchange rate through the signalling channel. The implication from the studies is that intervention 
can only have a temporary influence on the exchange rate. The conclusion from the survey is that 
although we may be able to explain why a central bank intervenes in the foreign exchange 
market, it remains difficult to find empirical evidence showing that intervention has a long-
lasting, quantitatively significantly effect.  
 20 
4.0 Methodology 
In both macroeconomic and financial economics, empirical research is based on time series, and 
time series are generally viewed as stochastic processes. The model builder is therefore allowed 
to use statistical inference in developing and testing equations that describe the relationships 
between economic variables. The two key properties of many economic time series that have 
been common in research work are non-stationarity and time-varying volatility. Foreign exchange 
market intervention falls under the second property, as such an action would result in 
unpredictable volatility. Researchers have attempted to model foreign exchange market 
intervention using various methodologies and approaches. The broad range of techniques presents 
researchers with different types of problems about which anyone assessing their results needs to 
be careful due to techniques used. The main problem in all empirical research on intervention is 
the simultaneous determination of official intervention and exchange rate changes.  
4.1 Alternative approaches 
In this study we considered a number of approaches to modelling foreign exchange market 
intervention and economic responses.  
4.1.1 Event study 
 An incident of intervention is defined as a period of days with official intervention in foreign 
exchange in one direction, including up to 10 days of no further intervention between the initial 
and subsequent intervention transaction. It requires systematic intervention transactions 
(Humpage, 1999). A quick look at Malawi’s experience shows that intervention transactions are 
not systematic. It takes long periods between one official purchase or sale of foreign exchange to 
the next. 
 
4.1.2 VAR models 
 Structural VAR models have been used to identify dynamic responses of an economy to 
particular shocks and this reveals the information about the dynamic properties of the economy 
that is being investigated. The results can be used to inform policy makers and economic 
forecasters how economic variables such as exchange rate and prices respond over time to 
changes in policy or other events. However, the discrete values and periodic nature of 
intervention make it difficult to estimate parameter values of reaction functions in a VAR (Kim, 
2003). 
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4.1.3  Profit criterion 
One simple yardstick to evaluate the role of official intervention is the profitability criterion: if 
official intervention yields a profit, it will reduce unnecessary exchange rate fluctuations, if it 
entails losses it will be an additional source of exchange rate instability. Friedman et al. (1953) 
stimulates academics to carry out studies in this field. Their main interest was to examine 
possibility of profitable but destabilizing speculation. Their conclusion was as follows: if a 
speculator6 is defined properly, and the excess demand curve of non-speculators is linear and has 
a negative slope, profitable speculation is bound to be destabilizing in the sense that it will reduce 
the variance in the exchange rate movement (Mayer and Taguchi, 1983).  
It has, however, been argued in Taguchi (1983) that except under very special circumstances, the 
profitability criterion cannot be employed in any meaningful sense as an indicator of the 
stabilizing effect of the official intervention. The profit criterion suffers from one basic 
shortcoming: it can at best tell whether official intervention was in the right direction, but it 
cannot provide information on the extent to which that intervention was successful in actually 
influencing exchange rate movements. On the contrary, to the extent that intervention was fully 
successful in ironing out unwanted exchange rate movements, the profit criterion would not be 
applicable. Conversely, if intervention was ineffective and failed to exert a significant influence 
on the exchange rate movements, the profit criterion would perform best, but would be irrelevant, 
since in that case official intervention would be meaningless from a macroeconomic point of 
view. The use of this criterion is therefore based on the implicit assumption that official 
intervention has had an impact on exchange rate movements, but only a limited one (Mayer and 
Taguchi, 1983).  
To sum up, in order for the profit criterion, even if used in more restrictive sense, to perform well, 
several conditions must apply. These are: the interest rate differential must be taken into account; 
the interest rate differential must be equal to the slope the underlying trend of equilibrium 
exchange rate level; if the intervention is not closed, instead of taking the last market rate to 
gauge the profitability of intervention, the equilibrium rate for that date must apply; and finally 
the effectiveness of intervention over the whole observation period has to be constant (Mayer and 
Taguchi, 1983).  
                                                
6
 A non-speculator is an economic agent who makes a decision independently of any rate other than the prevailing one; all other 
agents should be regarded as speculators.  
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4.1.4 Equilibrium exchange rate criterion 
This criterion is also known as the “divergence from equilibrium” criterion, according to which 
intervention is considered to be stabilizing (destabilizing) when it tends to push the exchange rate 
towards (away) from its equilibrium path. The equilibrium exchange rate criterion is based on an 
assumption of a moving equilibrium level. The criterion allows for changes in the underlying 
fundamentals and therefore movements in the equilibrium levels of the exchange rate itself. This 
approach requires the computation of the equilibrium path of the exchange rate (Pessach and 
Razin, 1990). The equilibrium exchange rate approach evaluates the impact of intervention by 
establishing whether the intervention, when it occurred, tended to push the market rate towards its 
then prevailing equilibrium level or away from it. Market fundamentals include such factors as 
money supply and real income. A change in money supply or real income in either country will 
affect the exchange rate (Pessach and Razin, 1990). 
 In a system of flexible exchange rates, exchange rate volatility depends on the volatility of 
market fundamentals and expectations. Hence some analysts believe that if policy makers could 
reduce the volatility of market fundamentals or the volatility of expectations, exchange rate 
volatility might also decline. Realignments become likely when exchange rate diverges from 
market fundamentals.  
This method has one technical drawback: it lacks the stabilizing effect of intervention in the same 
way whether the intervention occurs when the exchange rate is very close to equilibrium (but not 
at) its equilibrium path or whether it occurs when the exchange rate is out of the line. This may 
not be very satisfactory since it could be argued that there is no need for intervention as long as 
the exchange rate was in any event very close to what could be considered its equilibrium level. 
Again, since at any point in time equilibrium level cannot be defined with certainty and 
exactitude, there will be a serious danger of misidentification.  
4.1.5 Lean against the wind criterion:  
Researchers use leaning against the wind to refer to several concepts. The central bank may 
intervene to: (a1) reduce but not reverse short-term deviations that are thought to last a few weeks 
or, at most, months; (a2) reverse short-term deviations thought to last a few weeks or, at most, 
months; (a3) reduce temporary exchange-rate volatility for a few days, perhaps a week; (b) 
reduce but not reverse longer-term deviations from trend, perhaps up to a year of two; and (c) 
reverse persistent medium- or longer-term trends away from the bank’s perceived long-term trend 
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or level. In the following, short-term leaning against the wind refers to (a1), (a2) and (a3), and 
longer-term to (b) and (c) (Simatele and Sweeney, 2009). 
Using signalling or portfolio balance channels, central banks may implement leaning-against-the-
wind strategies in (b) or (c) for a year or more, perhaps indefinitely. For shorter-term effects as in 
(a1), signalling a change in monetary policy and then a reversal in a few weeks or months is 
likely ineffective. First, short-term changes have less effect. Second, there is always noise in the 
signalling channel that may take some time to overcome; the signal may get through just as it is 
time to reverse the signal. In what follows, then, short-term leaning against the wind intervention 
is thus taken as not signalling monetary policy changes. Longer-term leaning against the wind 
intervention may well depend on signalling monetary policy changes. Related, transitory and self-
reversing changes in proportions of portfolio assets under short-term leaning against the wind will 
affect the exchange rate much less than long-term changes (Simatele and Sweeney, 2009). 
 
4.1.6 Hybrid approach 
This approach incorporates some elements of the lean against the wind criterion and the 
equilibrium exchange rate criterion. It distinguishes between two types of exchange rate zones. 
First, a band through the hypothetical equilibrium rate within which the stabilizing impact of 
intervention is judged according to the lean against the wind criterion. Secondly, the exchange 
rate zones outside this band, where official intervention is evaluated in terms of its impact in 
pushing the exchange rate towards or away from its equilibrium path. In practice, the width of the 
leaning against the wind band should be a function of the prevailing degree of exchange rate 
uncertainty and might therefore change over time.  
 
4.1.7 Econometric model 
Lagged models are inappropriate since intervention appears to affect exchange rate movements 
within minutes and hours (Humpage, 1999). But for small open economies, where the financial 
system is still underdeveloped, econometric models such as the real equilibrium exchange rate 
models have been applied. Other studies have used monetary reaction functions to assess whether 
central banks lean against the wind. 
4.1.8 The GARCH/ARCH models 
Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) volatility in asset returns and exchange 
rates tends to gather around their marginal distributions. Modelling such time varying volatility 
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was initiated by Robert Engel (1982) through ARCH. To get around this problem Bollerslev 
(1986) proposes a generalized ARCH or GARCH (p, q) model. This is the model we adopted in 
this study; it is particularly favoured to take account of variance correlations typically found in 
financial data. The GARCH model is robust to various types of misspecification, can 
simultaneously model conditional mean and conditional variance(Edison, 1999). Researchers in 
finance and economics have argued that a GARCH framework provides an efficient parametric 
way of modelling uncertainty in high frequency econometric time series (Doroodian and 
Caporale, 2001).  
 
4.2 Econometric models 
4.2.1 GARCH model 
We adopted the GARCH and equilibrium exchange rate methodologies. We compared results 
from the GARCH model with those from the equilibrium exchange rate criterion. The first-order 
(p = q = 1) GARCH model, suggested by Taylor (1986), has since become the most popular 
ARCH model in practice. Compared to Engel’s (1982) basic ARCH model, the GARCH model is 
a useful improvement that allows a parsimonious specification. The GARCH (p, q) model on 
which this study is based takes the form: 
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where α0>0, αi≥0 for i=1,2, …., q and b≥0 for i=1,2,….,p. The GARCH (p, q) model successfully 
captures several characteristics of financial time series such as volatility.  
This study estimated and tested ARCH models, that is, it built the ARCH into the GARCH (p, q) 
model using the Eviews. Initially we regressed y on x using ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
obtained the residuals {εt}; then we computed the OLS regression ε2t=α0+α1ε2t+…+αpε2t-p+error; 
and tested the joint significance of α
…
α1. The hypothesis of interest was the extent to which 
changes in the conditional mean and conditional variance are associated with changes in the 
intervention variable. The general formulation of the model follows Edison and Liang (1999), 
adjusted to suit the Malawi situation: 
   
∆lnext = σ0 + + σ1lnNSt + σ2lnPDTPt + σ3lnEPt+σ4DMV+εt    (2) 
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ε t | It-1| ∼ N (0, ht)       (3) 
  
ht = βo + β1  NS+ σε2 t-1 + δ h t-1     (4) 
   
Where ∆lnext = log change in Malawi kwacha/US dollar (MK/US$), NS is net sales of foreign 
exchange (representing intervention), PDPTD is inflation differential between Malawi and its 
main trading partners,7 EP is parallel exchange rate premium (i.e. the spread between official and 
parallel market rates), DMV is dummy variable for seasonal trends in exchange rates,8 ε is a 
regression disturbance (forecast error), is absolute value operator, It-1 is information set 
through time t-1, and h is the time-varying variance of ε. 
Equation 2 measures the direct effect of net sales of foreign exchange (US dollars), price 
differential, exchange rate premium and seasonal factors on exchange rate changes. A positive 
coefficient on intervention variable indicates that net sales of the foreign currency (NS) depreciate 
the Malawi kwacha. Equation 3, (ε t | I t-1  | ∼ N (0, ht) states that the regression residuals will be 
modelled as a GARCH process. Equation 4 describes the conditional variance. The parameters of 
the model were estimated using the quasi-maximum likelihood approach of Bollerslev and 
Wooldridge (1992), which yields standard errors that are robust to non-normality in the density 
function underlying the residuals. Parameters σ and δ in Equation 4 are for the ARCH and 
GARCH terms respectively. The ARCH term (ε2t-1) measures volatility from a previous period 
measured as a lag of the squared residual from the mean equation. The GARCH term (ht-1) 
measures the last period’s forecast variance. 
4.2.2 The empirical model equilibrium exchange rate  
We used nominal and real exchange rate models (see Appendixes 4c and 4d for the models and 
Appendixes 4a and 4b for model results). The models were used to compute nominal and real 
equilibrium exchange rates respectively. For the nominal exchange rate, we used a model that 
combines features of both the monetary and the portfolio models for nominal exchange rate 
model. The empirical variant of SPMM is based on a specification form introduced by Frankel 
                                                
7
 Malawi’s main trading partners are USA, France, Germany, Zambia, Australia, Belgium, Netherlands, UK, Japan and South Africa. 
We created a basket inflation for these countries using their trading weights with Malawi.  
8
 Movements in exchange rate follows seasonal patterns related to the agricultural cycle. We used dummy variables for the four 
seasons in Malawi.  
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(1979). He argues that in the short run, as in the SPMM model, prices are sticky and thus 
purchasing power parity (PPP) does not hold continuously. 
As for the real exchange rate, we used Edward’s (1989) dynamic model9 for a real exchange rate 
model. Although this model was developed to describe nominal misalignment in fixed exchange 
rate regimes, it is well suited to identify fundamental variables that determine the Malawian real 
equilibrium exchange rate. First, Malawi is a low income country where pubic expenditure 
accounts for almost one-third of GDP, driven partly by large flows of external assistance. It is 
also relatively open with exports and imports exceeding 50% of GDP, and dependent on tobacco 
exports. Malawi is very dependent on import goods, both for consumption and investment. 
Finally, although the Malawi kwacha was floated in the mid 1990s, it has undergone periods of 
remarkably stability vis-à-vis the US dollar (Mathisen, 2003). 
4.3  Data 
We used monthly data series which include exchange rate (EX), net sales of foreign exchange as 
the intervention variable (NS), inflation differential between Malawi and its main trading partners 
(PDTP), parallel exchange rate premium (EP) and dummy variable for seasonality in exchange 
rate developments (DMV). We used nominal bilateral exchange rate of the Malawi kwacha 
against the US dollar. The parallel exchange rate premium is the difference between official 
exchange rate and parallel exchange rate. All variables are expressed in logs except for net sales 
(see Appendix 1a for more description of the variables used). 
5.0  Estimation and results    
5.1 Time series properties of the data 
The second step is to test the variables in the GARCH and equilibrium exchange rate models for 
unit roots and conduct the necessary cointegration tests (see Appendixes 1b, 2 and 3). The results 
showed that variables such as exchange rate (Ex), exchange rate premium (EP, and price 
differential between Malawi and its main trading partners (PDTP) are non-stationary (integrated 
of order one) and thus become stationary after first difference. However, net sales of foreign 
exchange (NS) is stationary (integrated of order zero) 
The next step is to find out whether RBM intervention (net sales of foreign exchange) in the 
foreign exchange market in Malawi affects the kwacha. Seasonal dummies were introduced for 
seasonal trends in kwacha movements. We set off by running an OLS equation of the exchange 
rate deprecations on a constant, the net sales of foreign exchange, parallel exchange rate premium 
and inflation differential (to take care of balance of payments pressure) and the seasonal dummy 
                                                
9
 See Williamson 1994 for an in-depth discussion of the model. 
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variable (to take care of seasonal trends in kwacha fluctuations). The results are indicated in 
Table 3  
 
Table 3: Conditional mean equation 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic 
C    0.01440 1.15587 
DMV 0.082142 1.36969 
∆LNPDTP (-1) 0.84078 3.93214 
∆EP 0.000416 20.451010 
NS 0.651467 3.32534 
R-squared 0.414862 
 
D_W test 1.525484 
 
 
The results indicate that net sales of foreign exchange by RBM depreciate the kwacha. The results 
also indicate that price differentials between Malawi and its main trading partners affect the 
kwacha. As the price differentials widen, the kwacha tends to depreciate. It is also necessary to 
find out whether net sales of foreign exchange affect the volatility of the kwacha. We conducted 
ARCH tests on the residuals of the conditional mean equation to test for the presence of ARCH 
effects. The results are presented in Table 4 below. A graphical exposition of the residuals from 
the ARCH process show that the residuals are hoteroskedatsic (see Figure 8) 
Table 4: ARCH Test 
F-statistic                     0.32545 Probability   0.04408 
Obs*R-squared           0.376507 Probability  0.03675 
 
Figure 8: The residuals are heteroskedastic  
 28 
-0.02
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
1/02/02 10/09/02 7/16/03 4/21/04 1/26/05
RESID
 
Results from the ARCH tests indicated that we reject the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects in 
the equation. Since ARCH effects were present (i.e. presence of heteroskedasticity in the 
residuals), we proceeded to estimate a GARCH (1,1) model and simultaneously estimated the 
effect of net sales of foreign exchange on both the mean and volatility of the kwacha.  
 
In this study, we used the GARCH method to model the heteroskedastic errors in our conditional 
mean equation. The GARCH model is robust to various types of misspecification compared to 
Engel’s (1982) basic ARCH model. This approach is also beneficial because it allowed us to 
simultaneously test the effect of intervention on both the mean and conditional volatility of 
kwacha. We ran GARCH model for two sample periods:  model 1 for the entire period 1995–
2008 and model 2 for the post-2003 period, when the nominal exchange rate was relatively stable. 
The GARCH equations allow the intervention terms to affect both the conditional mean and 
variance of the series. The conditional variance provides an excellent proxy for near-term 
exchange rate volatility. The results from both models are indicated in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: GARCH estimation of exchange rate 
                                     
   
                                         Conditional mean equation 
 
                                     Model 1 Model2 
 Constant     0.03563 
   (1.17198) 
0.0421 
(1.1840 
NS                0.61854 
   (3.20342) 
 
-0.01231 
(1.1426) 
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1−∆ tEP     0.08242 
   (1.35534) 
 
0.00506 
(0.04711) 
 
1−tPDTP     0.85312 
               (3.96541) 
 
0.25783 
(2.72062) 
 
DMV     0.075449 
(1.32336) 
 
0.06542 
              (1.26724) 
 
Conditional variance equation 
Model 1    Model2 
 
Constant   2.5240 
              (5.18543) 
 
1.6436 
(4.0287) 
 
NS   0.5649 
   (3.1824) 
 
-0.01384 
(1.1265) 
 
)( 2 1−tARCH ε              0.422242 
              (2.42462) 
 
0.53509 
 
(2.56213) 
 
)( 1−thGARCH               0.505321 
              (2.48082) 
 
0.42059 
(2.43812)  
 
    
 
   
The values in brackets are t-statistics. 
The positive sign on the intervention term (NS) in the mean equation of model 1 suggested that 
official sales of US dollars are associated with the depreciation of the Malawi kwacha. In other 
words, when the RBM sells foreign exchange with the intention of appreciating the kwacha, the 
kwacha depreciates instead.10 This is not a surprising result for Malawi, as US dollars are 
normally sold when foreign reserves are low, so they coincide with a depreciating kwacha. The 
results suggest that the Bank intervenes in the market to reduce the rate of depreciation. In the 
literature, this result is generally interpreted as leaning against the wind, i.e. intervention prevents 
a steeper depreciation from occurring. In other words, RBM intervenes to reduce, but not to 
                                                
10
 This reflects an endogeneity problem. In other words, we are picking up influences from an RBM reaction function rather than 
isolating the impact of intervention. This suggests that RBM is choosing a positive value for NS whenever it thinks EX is going to be 
too big. What we are estimating is some combination of intervention parameter and reaction function parameter.  
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reverse, around-trend-exchange rate depreciations. This finding is in line with the results of work 
done by Simatele (2004), Edison et al. (1999) and Baillie and Osterberg (1997).  
We also suspect that the results are reflecting speculation in the foreign exchange market. Typical 
of small economies, even after a Reserve Bank sale, the dollar tends to quickly dry out on the 
market due small magnitudes of foreign exchange sales. What happens is that market speculators 
buy as much foreign exchange as possible after foreign exchange sales by the Reserve Bank; they 
withhold the money until the exchange rate rises again, and then sell.11  
However, the negative sign on the intervention term on model 2 suggests that official sales of US 
dollars for the post-2003 period were associated with an appreciation of the kwacha. This 
interpretation might be misleading as the coefficient was both statistically insignificant and too 
small. Results from both models also indicate that price differentials between Malawi and its 
main trading partners affect the kwacha. As price differentials widen, the kwacha tends to 
depreciate. Similarly, a higher exchange rate premium depreciates the kwacha. 
The positive coefficients on the intervention term in the conditional variance equation for model 1 
reveal that official intervention leads to an increase in exchange rate volatility. This is in line with 
findings in other studies (such as Doroodian and Caporale, 2001). This means that the 
intervention operations of the RBM may have sent ambiguous signals (of both its intervention 
operations and future monetary policy) to the foreign exchange market and consequently added 
some uncertainty to the market. This outcome supports the views of Friedman (1953) and 
Schwartz (1996) that exchange rate intervention serves to destabilize the foreign exchange market 
by introducing additional levels of exchange rate uncertainty. However, the coefficient on the 
intervention variable in the conditional variance equation for model 2 reveals that official 
intervention during the post-2003 period tended to reduce volatility. This outcome is in line with 
the findings of Dominguez (1992)12 and Simatele (2004). The ARCH (σ) and GARCH (δ) terms 
are both positive and statistically significant.  
The conflicting outcomes from the two GARCH models on the impact of intervention on 
exchange rate volatility led us to employ another approach: the equilibrium exchange rate 
criterion. We modelled equilibrium exchange rate for the entire period to help us compute 
equilibrium exchange rates (see Appendixes 6 and 7 for the results of nominal and real 
equilibrium models). Our task was to evaluate the Bank’s intervention in the foreign exchange 
                                                
11
 See Simatele (2004).  
12
 Dominguez (1992b ) finds that U.S. intervention has tended to decrease exchange rate volatility except for the period 1985 to 1987, 
which increased volatility. 
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market using the equilibrium exchange rate criterion. We evaluated the impact of official 
intervention by establishing whether intervention when it occurred pushed the market rate 
towards its prevailing equilibrium level or away from it.  
Figure 9: Nominal and real exchange rate misalignment  
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Data source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Monthly Economic Reviews (December, 2009; December, 2003 and December, 2000)  
 
The results in Figure 9 show that, since the exchange rate was floated in 1994, the nominal 
exchange rate had been mostly undervalued for most of the period (1994–2003). But for most of 
the post-2003 period, the nominal exchange rate remained overvalued. However, the real 
effective exchange rate (REER) assumed the opposite behaviour to that of the nominal exchange 
rate—appreciating as the nominal depreciated. This could be reflecting inflation differentials 
which seem to have been adversely affecting Malawi’s competitiveness for most of the 1990s and 
from 2003 to 2006. From 2007 onwards the REER regained its competitiveness (depreciating) as 
inflation levels kept declining.  
Almost the entire study period is characterized by wide oscillations, capturing exchange rate 
misalignments (Figure 9). This implies that both the nominal and real exchange rates were 
frequently drifting away from their equilibrium rates. This implies that the RBM interventions 
failed to push the nominal exchange rate toward its equilibrium level. Instead the market 
exchange rate was pushed away from its equilibrium path. So interventions during this period 
were destabilizing and increased volatility. This outcome is in line with findings from GARCH 
methodology (model1) which indicates that RBM interventions during the entire study period 
served to destabilize the foreign exchange market by introducing additional levels of exchange 
rate uncertainty. The only exception was the post-2003 period, particularly in 2004 and 2005, 
when the interventions were stabilizing as the market exchange rates were pushed closer to the 
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equilibrium path. This exception seems to agree with findings from GARCH model 2 that official 
intervention during the post- 2003 period reduced exchange rate volatility. 
In general, the results from both the GARCH model and the equilibrium exchange rate criterion 
show that RBM intervention has been associated with increased exchange rate volatility, except 
during the post-2003 period, particularly in 2004 and 2005.  
 
6.0     Conclusion and Policy implications  
 
This study analysed the effectiveness of foreign exchange market interventions carried out by the 
RBM using the GARCH model and the equilibrium exchange rate criterion. The study used 
monthly data of RBM intervention (net sales of foreign exchange), and exchange rate, among 
others, from January 1995 to June 2008. We started off by running a conditional mean equation 
using changes in exchange rate as a dependent variable. The results showed the presence of 
ARCH effects. We then ran a GARCH (1,1) model by quasi-maximum likelihood for the entire 
study period. In line with similar findings elsewhere in the literature, this study found that net 
sales of dollars by the RBM depreciate, rather than appreciate, the kwacha. Empirically, this 
implies that RBM leans against the wind. In other words, the RBM intervenes to reduce, but not 
to reverse, around-trend exchange rate depreciation. However, the negative sign on the 
intervention term on model 2 suggests that official sales of US dollars for the post-2003 period 
were associated with an appreciation of the kwacha. This interpretation might be misleading as 
the coefficient is both insignificant and too small. 
Results from the equilibrium exchange rate criterion show that RBM interventions failed to push 
the exchange rate towards its equilibrium levels. Instead the market rate was pushed away from 
its equilibrium level, indicating that intervention during the study period increased volatility. This 
outcome is in line with findings from GARCH methodology (model1) which indicates that RBM 
interventions during the entire study period served to destabilize the foreign exchange market by 
introducing additional levels of exchange rate uncertainty. The only exception was the post-2003 
period, particularly in 2004 and 2005, as market exchange rates were close to their equilibrium 
path. This exception seems to agree with findings from GARCH model 2 that official intervention 
during the post-2003 period reduced exchange rate volatility. 
In general, the results from both the GARCH model and the equilibrium exchange rate criterion 
show that RBM intervention has been associated with increased exchange rate volatility, except 
in 2004 and 2005. The implication of this finding is that intervention can only have a temporary 
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influence on the exchange rate, as it is difficult to find empirical evidence showing that 
intervention has a long lasting, quantitatively significant effect.  
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Appendix 1:   Variables definitions 
Variable name   Variable description 
Ext      Malawi kwacha – United States dollar exchange rate 
 NS   Net sales of foreign exchange capturing Reserve Bank of Malawi 
interventions   
 DMV     Dummy variable for seasonal trends in exchange rates 
 EP                                 Parallel exchange rate premium 
 PDTP   Inflation differential between Malawi and its main trading 
partners 
        The absolute value operator 
   It     The information set through time t-1 
   εt      The disturbance term 
   ε2 t-1    ARCH term 
   h t-1    GARCH term 
 
govgdp    Logarithm of government consumption as a share of GDP 
wsgdp     Government spending on wages and salaries as a share of 
invgdp                         Investment as a share of GDP ( invgdp ),  
           tot    Terms of trade goods ( tot ),  
 tp     Technological progress 
 mp     Monetary policy proxy 
 fagdp    Fiscal policies proxy  
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   lid  Logarithm of interest rate differential, computed using the short-
term (91-day) London Inter-bank offer rate (LIBOR) and the 91-
day Treasury bill rate 
lpd  Logarithm of inflation differential computed as the difference 
between domestic inflation and inflation rate in major trading 
partners.  
gdpca _  Current account balance as a proportion of nominal (quarterly) 
GDP 
2lm     Log of money supply 
 
Appendix 2 
Figure 10a: Nominal exchange rate and gross official reserves (1995–2008) 
nominal exchange rate and foreign reserves (gross)
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 Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Monthly Economic Reviews  (December, 2000; December, 2003, and December, 2009)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10b: Official and commercial bank reserves (1995–2008) 
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Source: Reserve bank of Malawi, Monthly Economic Reviews (December  2009, December, 
2003; and December, 2000) 
 
Figure 10c:  Ratio of official and commercial bank reserves to gross reserves 
ratio of official and commercial bank reserves to gross reserves
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Source: Reserve Bank of Malawi, Monthly Economic Reviews (December, 2009; December, 
2003; and December, 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Unit root tests for variables in the models 
Variable ADF test stat  PP test stat.  order of Int. 
 41 
lne  -1.754718  -1.107811 
∆ lne  -4.164111  -3.900384   I(1) 
Ns  -4.7890  -6.29374   I(0)   
pdtp  1.32462 1.524334 
pdtp∆   -4.6509  5.623109   I(1) 
lnrer  -2.56436  -2.11342 
∆ lnrer  -5.27519  -5.33015   I(1) 
govcngdpln  -2.75410  -2.00509 
lnird  -1.51355  -0.925450 
∆ lnird  -5.529812  -5.69811   I(1) 
lnm2  -0.518479  -0.319449 
∆ lnm2  -7.522544  -11.79298   I(1) 
nfa_gdp -2.581926  -4.454167 
∆ nfa_gdp -7.378059      I(1) 
 lnf_gdp -3.523250  -4.454167   I(0)   
lnmp  -2.45329  -3.54376  
mpln∆    -5.67840 .89064    I(1)                
lnpdtp  -4.161990  -3.490758   I(0) 
 Critical values are -3.5066 and –3.5045 at 5 % significance level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 4: Cointegration test for the nominal exchange rate model variables 
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Date: 10/25/08   Time: 07:39 
Sample(adjusted): 1997:1 2007:4 
Included observations: 44 after adjusting endpoints 
Trend assumption: Quadratic deterministic trend 
Series: LNEX LIRD LM2 TB_GDP 
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4 
     
Unrestricted cointegration rank test 
Hypothesized  Trace 5%  1%  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue statistic critical value critical value 
None * 0.509457 57.35575 54.64 61.24 
At most 1 0.367646 26.01712 34.55 40.49 
At most 2 0.124200 5.851667 18.17 23.46 
At most 3 0.000375 0.016482 3.74 6.40 
* (**) denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% (1%) level; trace test 
indicates 1 cointegrating equation(s) at the 5% level; trace test indicates no 
cointegration at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
[A]Appendix 5: Johansen cointegration test for the real exchange rate model 1 
Hypothesized no. of 
cointegrating vectors 
Eigenvalue Trace stat 5% critical value 1% critical value 
None* 
At most 1 
At most 2 
At most 3 
 
0.4352698 
0.3225672 
0.2236942 
0.0822310 
62.36948 
28.36436 
6.416240 
0.012631 
56.37 
 38.04 
 20.78 
  4.22 
68.57 
46.20 
29.66 
 7.95 
*(**) indicates rejection of the hypothesis at 5%(1%) level; the trace statistic indicates I 
cointegrating equation(s) at 5 % level of significance; trace statistic indicates no cointegration at 
1% level. 
 
 
 
Appendix 6: long run nominal exchange rate equation 
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Dependent variable: LNEX 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 10/24/08   Time: 01:41 
Sample: 1995:4 2007:4 
Included observations: 49 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LM2 0.864234 0.023943 36.09581 0.0000 
LIRD 0.335255 0.038412 8.727815 0.0000 
TB_GDP 1.165300 0.687668 1.694567 0.0972 
DUM -0.005179 0.017538 -0.295323 0.7691 
C -4.940967 0.282342 -17.49992 0.0000 
R-squared 0.971821 Mean dependent var 4.079290 
Adjusted R-squared 0.969259 S.D. dependent var 0.776660 
S.E. of regression 0.136172 Akaike info criterion -1.053340 
Sum squared resid 0.815888 Schwarz criterion -0.860297 
Log likelihood 30.80682 F-statistic 379.3601 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 7: Results from the error correction model of real exchange rate13 
                                                
13
 Model 1 shows results using data for the entire period. Model 2 has results from data for the period 
2003–2006 when the exchange rate was relatively stable.  
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Dependent (real exchange rate) 
   Model 1   
   Coefficient  t-stat 
Constant   -0.0564   -0.5523      
1ln −∆ te     0.0847    0.6652     
2ln −tgovcngdp  -0.1325    -1.9216      
1ln −∆ tnwsgdp    0.0245      0.2134        
2ln −∆ tnwsgdp   0.0525      0.4213      
1ln −∆ ttp    -0.8617     -0.6285                 
2ln −∆ ttp    -0.7465     -0.5442                
1ln −∆ ttot               0.0342                   0.1863         
 
2ln −∆ ttot              -0.1526     -1.9847   
            
1ln −∆ tinvgdp             -0.0365                  -0.3572   
             
2ln −∆ tinvgdp   0.0984                    0.7453     
                           
1−∆ tnfa                  -0.0219                   -0.3252  
                 
2−∆ tnfa               0.0042         0.1375                               
   
1ln −∆ tmp               0.0434           0.3823            
                
2ln −∆ tmp                  -0.0534                   -0. 4841 
     
coint. equat               -0.1357         180960   
              
2R    0.5253       
Adjusted R2   0.1874   
S.E. equation  0.1251  
F statistic   1.5250    
Log likelihood  83.204     
Akaike IC              -1.6419                
Schwarz SC              -1.3437                            
 
 
Appendix 8: The empirical model for nominal exchange rate 
We used a model that combines features of both the monetary and the portfolio models. The 
empirical variant of SPMM is based on a specification form introduced by Frankel (1979). He 
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argues that in the short run, as in the SPMM model, prices are sticky and thus PPP does not hold 
continuously. Frankel (1979) modifies the basic assumptions of the original Dornbusch (1993) 
model to allow for differences in secular rates of inflation.  
Based on Meese and Rogoff’s (1983,) interpretation that the cumulative trade and current account 
balance terms are variables that allow for changes in the long-run exchange rate, and by 
incorporating stochastic elements in the model, we obtain the estimable version as, 
tttttttt CAiippe µβρρββββ ++−+−+−+= )()()()( 4*3*2*10     (1) 
where  
 )( *tt pp − = inflation differential 
)( *tt ii − = interest rate differential 
)( *tt ρρ −  = expected inflation differential 
  λ  = coefficient of adjustment 
 )( *ρρ − = expected inflation differential 
Using et = exet ln= , 
*
tt pp − = lpd and 
*
tt ii − = lird, equation 1 is re-written as an 
autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model with n lags  
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 where lex = logarithm of nominal exchange rate 
=lid  Logarithm of interest rate differential, computed using the short-term 
(91-day) London Inter-bank offer rate (LIBOR) and the 91-day Treasury 
bill rate 
lpd = logarithm of inflation differential computed as the difference between 
domestic inflation and inflation rate in major trading partners.  
gdpca _ =current account balance as a proportion of nominal (quarterly) GDP 
2lm = log of money supply 
=lNef net donor inflows 
 Given the nature of time series data, Equation 2 contains non-stationary variables, which on 
being differenced become stationary. However, that would imply that the long-run properties of 
the theoretical model are lost. To recover the long-run information, parameters for Equation 2 
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need to be reset into an error correction model (ECM), assuming that the non-stationary variables 
are integrated of the first order. Therefore, Equation 2 parameters are reset into Equation 3 with 
the error correction term in brackets. 
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Appendix 9: equilibrium real exchange rate 
 
Edward’s (1989) theoretical model identifies the following fundamental variables as the most 
important ones in determining equilibrium real exchange rate: the level and composition of 
government expenditure, external terms of trade, investment and capital flows. In addition, a 
variable has been added to capture the Balassa-Samuelson effect (MacDonald and Ricci, 2001, 
2002), and two variables have been added to capture the temporary misalignment induced by 
inconsistent macroeconomic policies. Hence the empirical model for equilibrium real exchange 
rate is: 
  
ttttt
ttttt
fpmpnfagdptp
totinvgdpwsgdpgovcngdpex
εαααα
ααααα
+++∆+
+++++=
lnlnln
lnlnlnln
8765
43210
*
   
        (4)  
where the logarithm of real exchange rate ( *tex ) is a function of logarithm of government 
consumption as a share of GDP ( govgdp ), government spending on wages and salaries as a 
share of GDP ( wsgdp ), investment as a share of GDP ( invgdp ), terms of trade of goods ( tot ), 
technological progress ( tp ), i.e., real per capita growth, capital flows ( fagdp ), monetary 
policies( mp ), i.e., money supply as share of GDP,  and fiscal policies ( fp ) i.e. bank credit to 
government as a share of GDP, and error term (ε ). 
This analysis concentrates on permanent changes in the explanatory variables that bring about 
changes in the long run RER. The equilibrium real exchange rate (ERER) is associated with 
fundamental variables in their steady state levels. Deviations of these variables from their 
respective steady states results in deviations in ERER. This approach prevents the bias introduced 
by using the observed values to estimate the long run cointegrating relationship between the real 
exchange rate and the fundamentals, as a temporary shock would have a permanent impact on 
ERER (Mathisen, 2003).  
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